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The inﬂuence of monetary incentives on performance has been widely investigated among
various disciplines. While the results reveal positive incentive effects only under speciﬁc
conditions, the exact nature, and the contribution of mediating factors are largely unex-
plored.The present study examined inﬂuences of payoff schemes as one of these factors.
In particular, we manipulated penalties for errors and slow responses in a speeded catego-
rization task.The data show improved performance for monetary over symbolic incentives
when (a) penalties are higher for slow responses than for errors, and (b) neither slow
responses nor errors are punished. Conversely, payoff schemes with stronger punishment
for errors than for slow responses resulted in worse performance under monetary incen-
tives.The ﬁndings suggest that an emphasis of speed is favorable for positive inﬂuences
of monetary incentives, whereas an emphasis of accuracy under time pressure has the
opposite effect.
Keywords: monetary reward, ﬂanker task, attentional effort, speed–accuracy tradeoff
INTRODUCTION
The assumption that incentives – and in particular monetary
rewards–havebeneﬁcialeffectsonperformanceiswidelyaccepted
andfrequentlydetermineshumandecisionsandbehavior.Empir-
icaldata,however,supportthisintuitionatbestpartly,andreviews
of the corresponding literature reveal a rather inconclusive mix-
ture of results (Jenkins et al., 1998; Camerer and Hogarth, 1999;
Bonner et al., 2000; Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002). Bonner et al.
(2000), for instance, found in their meta study that monetary
rewards improve performance in no more than half of the cases.
Intheotherhalf,incentiveshadnoeffectorevenimpairedperfor-
mance. Apparently, incentive effects depend on the interplay with
other moderating variables that have to be taken into account for
a comprehensive understanding of the relation between reward
and behavior. Accordingly, Bonner and Sprinkle (2002) speciﬁed
a number of mediating factors, such as person variables, task dif-
ﬁculty,environmental conditions,and incentive schemes. Despite
the identiﬁcation of these factors, however, their particular con-
tribution to reward effects has rarely been studied systematically.
Thepresentstudythereforeaimedatfurtherexploringoneofthese
links and investigated inﬂuences of different incentive schemes on
perceptual decision making under time pressure.
Our starting point was a recent study by Hübner and Schlösser
(2010) that revealed a positive relation between monetary incen-
tives and performance in a ﬂanker task (Eriksen and Eriksen,
1974). In this experiment, participants received a positive pay-
off of 10 points for correct responses that were faster than a
given deadline. Erroneous responses before deadline expiration
resulted in a loss of 10 points, whereas responses exceeding the
deadline entailed a 20 point penalty, irrespective of correctness.
Thus, under this payoff scheme, response speed would ideally be
adjusted in a way that avoids deadline misses without sacriﬁcing
too much accuracy. The result shows that participants receiving
performance-contingent monetary reward (earned points were
convertedtomoney)wereabletofollowthisstrategymoresuccess-
fully than participants getting a ﬁxed amount of money (earned
pointswereonlysymbolic).Yet,itremaineduncleartowhatextent
this ﬁnding translates to other payoff schemes.
Given the sensitivity of incentive effects to mediating factors,it
is possible that this pattern of results is speciﬁc for payoff schemes
comprising relatively small rewards for rapid decisions in com-
bination with high penalties for slow responses. That penalties
play a special role for behavior is indicated by the phenomenon of
loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kah-
neman, 1991). In their seminal work, Kahneman and Tversky
demonstrated that loss and disadvantage have a greater impact
on decisions than gain or beneﬁts. Thus, payoff schemes relying
on high penalties rather than on bonuses may effectively inﬂu-
ence performance. In fact, there is some evidence indicating an
increaseofeffortunderimpendingpenalties(Hannanetal.,2005).
Accordingly,especiallytheriskof losingmoney(comparedtoonly
symbolic points) may encourage the mobilization of additional
resources and motivate an increase of attentional effort to achieve
optimal performance (Sarter et al., 2006).
Despite these considerations, though, the exact role of penal-
ties in payoff schemes remains unclear. With respect to Hübner
and Schlösser (2010), for instance, it is an open question whether
positive incentive effects rely on punishment especially of slow
responses or whether monetary penalties for incorrect responses
per se trigger enhanced performance. Different behavior for these
two variants of payoff schemes is possible because they presum-
ably involve different response strategies. In particular, with high
penalties for slow responses,an advantageous strategy is a general
increaseof reactionspeed,suchthatdeadlinecriteriaaremeteven
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if this comes at the cost of accuracy. A wealth of studies examin-
ing the speed–accuracy tradeoff have shown that participants are
remarkably good in adjusting their response latencies even to very
brief time limits by accepting higher error rates (e.g., Link and
Tindall, 1971; McElree and Carrasco, 1999; Miller et al., 2008). In
fact, formal models are able to simulate this behavior accurately
and to predict response time and error distributions via shifts of
corresponding decision criteria (Ratcliff and Rouder,1998; Usher
and McClelland, 2001; Ratcliff and Smith, 2004; Hübner et al.,
2010). Thus, it is conceivable that participants can easily identify
and apply a strategy of speeding up responses if required, espe-
cially when monetary loss is higher for slow responses than for
errors.
In comparison, a payoff scheme with higher punishment for
errors than for slow responses may cause a different behavior
because the relevance of accuracy augments relative to that of
speed.Inthiscaseslowresponsesareproﬁtablebecausetheygrant
higher accuracy while the cost of missing time requirements is
comparably low.At the same time,however,the presence of dead-
lines induces time pressure, resulting in a competition between
subjectiveaccuracyandobjectivespeeddemands.Thenecessityof
highaccuracywithoutanovermuchreductionofspeedpotentially
increases task complexity and the involvement of corresponding
cognitive strategies, a situation that has proven to be detrimental
for positive effects of monetary incentives (Bonner et al., 2000).
It is therefore possible that positive incentive effects decline or
even vanish under payoff schemes that emphasize accuracy in
speeded response tasks. The present study examined this issue by
manipulating the relative height of penalties for errors and slow
responses.
To grant comparability to previous ﬁndings, we adopted the
experimental setup and procedure from Hübner and Schlösser
(2010). In particular, we used a ﬂanker task (Eriksen and Eriksen,
1974) that requires the classiﬁcation of a target stimulus in pres-
ence of response-incompatible or neutral ﬂankers. As a standard
ﬁnding, responses are slower and less accurate to targets accom-
panied by incongruent compared to neutral ﬂankers. This ﬂanker
effect is often considered as an index for the efﬁciency of selective
spatial attention. That is, a small effect indicates that attention
is narrowly focused on the target stimulus, which largely pre-
vents co-processing of ﬂankers. Conversely, a large ﬂanker effect
signals a wide attentional span, such that ﬂankers substantially
contribute to stimulus processing and response selection. In this
case, incongruent ﬂankers co-activate the incorrect response and
therefore evoke a response conﬂict (e.g., Eriksen and St. James,
1986;LaBergeetal.,1991;Grattonetal.,1992;Hübneretal.,2010).
Although Hübner and Schlösser (2010) found a general improve-
ment of performance under monetary incentives there was no
strong evidence for an increase of selective spatial attention; how-
ever, a trend toward a smaller ﬂanker effect for short deadlines
pointed to slightly enhanced selective attention in the monetary
condition. Yet, there is also evidence that incentives may enhance
distractor effects (Seifert et al., 2006). In a ﬂanker task, Seifert
and colleagues reported generally faster response times for trials
holding out rewards or penalties as compared to non-incentivized
trials. Error rates, however, revealed a larger ﬂanker effect for the
rewardedcondition.Giventhesereversepatterns,thepresentstudy
also tested again whether monetary incentives improve or impair
selective attention.
EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment1examinedwhethermonetaryincentiveshaveaposi-
tive effect on performance when deadline misses are not punished
(DLnP scheme). Correct and erroneous responses faster than the
deadline were rewarded with a 10-point gain and loss, respec-
tively. For comparison, we also included a condition in which
deadline misses were additionally punished by a loss of 20 points
(DLP scheme),apayoffschemethathaspreviouslyyieldedpositive
incentive effects (Hübner and Schlösser, 2010).
Weexpectedimprovedperformanceformonetarycomparedto
symbolicincentivesforboththeDLPandtheDLnPpayoff scheme
if incentive effects are independent from penalties for deadline
misses. Alternatively, if punishment of slow responses is crucial
for positive effects in these schemes, the inﬂuence of monetary
incentivesshouldbestrongerundertheDLPthanundertheDLnP
scheme.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
A total of 104 voluntary participants recruited at the University of
KonstanzwererandomlyassignedeithertotheDeadline-Punished
(DLP, N=50) or to the Deadline-not-Punished (DLnP, N=54)
payoff scheme1. Within each payoff group, an equal number of
subjects was randomly allotted to the monetary (DLP: 22.7years,
19 female; DLnP: 21.5years,21 female) and to the symbolic incen-
tive condition (DLP: 22.8years, 18 female; DLnP: 23.6years, 18
female). Payoff and incentive conditions are described in detail
below.
Apparatus and stimuli
Stimuli were presented on an 18   color-monitor with a resolu-
tion of 1280×1024 pixels and a refresh rate of 60Hz. A com-
putermouseservedasresponsedevice.Stimuluspresentationand
response registration were controlled by the same computer.
Numerals from two to nine served as target items in a parity-
judgment task. Stimulus congruency was manipulated by two
identical ﬂankers on either horizontal side of the target. For
incongruent stimuli, ﬂankers consisted of response-incompatible
numerals, i.e., ﬂankers and targets differed in parity. For neutral
stimuli the characters $,&,?,or # were used as ﬂankers. The target
was always presented at screen center. Each character extended a
visual angle of approximately 0.9˚ horizontally and 1.27˚ degrees
vertically, the spacing between characters (center to center) was
1.27˚ of visual angle. Stimuli were presented in white on a black
background.
Payoff and incentives
Participants were assigned to one of two payoff schemes. In the
Deadline-Punished scheme(DLP or[10,−10;−20]),theyreceived
1Theexperimentwasperformedinaccordancewiththeethicalstandardslaiddown
in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki. In agreement with the ethics and safety guide-
lines at the Universität Konstanz, we obtained a verbal informed consent statement
from all individuals prior to their participation in the study. Potential participants
wereinformedoftheirrighttoabstainfromparticipationinthestudyortowithdraw
consent to participate at any time without reprisal.
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10 points for correct responses that were faster than the deadline.
Forincorrectresponsesthatwerefasterthanthedeadline,theylost
10points.Ifthedeadlinewasmissedtheylost20pointsirrespective
of response correctness. Similarly, in the Deadline-not-Punished
scheme (DLnPor [10, −10; 0]),responses faster than the deadline
resulted in a 10-point gain for correct and in a 10-point loss for
incorrect answers. However,there was neither a gain nor a penalty
for responses missing the deadline.
Incentives were either symbolic or monetary in both payoff
schemes. Participants in the symbolic condition were informed
thatthepointstheyearnedthroughouttheexperimentareindica-
tive for their performance but that payment (8 EUR) is indepen-
dent from their balance. In the monetary condition, the earned
pointswereconvertedtomoneyaftertheexperiment.Participants
were told that they would receive a base payment of 6 EUR and
could earn an additional amount of up to 5 EUR, depending on
their ﬁnal balance. Information about payoff scheme and incen-
tiveconditionwasgivenpriortotheexperiment.Inallconditions,
a start-up balance was set to a value of 1000 points.
Procedure
Participantswereseatedatadistanceof approximately50cmfrom
the monitor. Their task was to indicate the parity of the target
numeral by pressing the corresponding mouse button with the
index or middle ﬁnger of their right hand. A trial started with
a central ﬁxation cross for 400ms. After a cue–stimulus interval
of 600ms, the stimulus array appeared for 165ms. The screen
remained blank until response. A feedback screen (see below)
appeared then for 1300ms and was followed by a blank screen
for another 1000ms before the next trial started. Categorization
errors were signaled by a brief sound. A total of nine blocks à
64 trials with three blocks of each of the long (650ms), medium
(525ms),andshort(450ms)deadlineswerepresentedindecreas-
ing order. Note that this is different to the study of Hübner and
Schlösser (2010) who counterbalanced deadline sequences across
participants to account for speciﬁc effects of fatigue and learn-
ing in speed–accuracy tradeoff functions (SATFs). We chose only
decreasingordersbecausedeadlinecounterbalancingwasnotcru-
cial for the present objective, and because a reanalysis of Hübner
and Schlösser’s data revealed the most reliable incentive effects for
decreasing deadlines. The experimental session took 1h.
Feedback
Aftereachresponse,afeedbackscreeninformedparticipantsabout
their performance. Feedback showed the current response time in
green color if the response was correct and faster than the dead-
line,inrediftheresponsewasanerrorbutfasterthanthedeadline,
and in yellow if the deadline was missed, irrespective of response
correctness. In addition, the current deadline and the total sum
of points were displayed. After each block, participants took a
short break (maximally 60s) while an additional feedback screen
informedabouttheoverallperformance,i.e.,meanresponsetime,
error rate, and percentage of missed deadlines in the last block as
well as the current point balance (accumulated over all blocks).
Data analyses
Responsetimesshorterthan100msandlongerthan2500mswere
discarded. Mean response latencies (deadline misses and errors
not excluded) and accuracies (proportion of correct answers) are
shown in Table 1. Data are illustrated as SATFs in Figure 1.
Because performance is reﬂected in response times as well as
in accuracy, the consideration of both dependent variables is cru-
cial for a comprehensive data description. As a pitfall, however,
the two measures are naturally correlated, that is, longer response
latencies come along with a larger proportion of correct answers
(Figure1). Consequently,independent analyses of response times
and accuracy are often difﬁcult to interpret and may even lead
to inaccurate conclusions (Wickelgren, 1977). For instance, it is
hard to decide whether performance is superior in an experimen-
tal condition that yields higher accuracy but also longer response
times than a second condition. As another example, an overall
increase in performance might show up partly in response times
and partly in accuracies (cf, Figure 1), so that effects in both
measures are merely indicated by non-signiﬁcant trends. Such
results may then be interpreted in favor of the null hypothesis,
although the data suggest an overall improved performance in
one condition.
Fortunately,SATFsprovideasolutionforthisdilemmabecause
thesefunctionsallowthetransformationofoneperformancemea-
sureintoanother.Inotherwords,SATFsrelateeachresponsetime
to a unique value of accuracy. They therefore permit the esti-
mation of effects in response times at equalized accuracy levels
(and vice versa) across experimental conditions. As an example,
consider our data for neutral ﬂankers at the longest deadline in
the DLnP scheme (Figure1). Here,monetary incentives yielded a
mean response time of 498ms and an accuracy level of 94.3%.
In the symbolic condition, mean response time and accuracy
amounted to 463ms and 96.2%, respectively. SATFs can now be
used to adjust both data points to the same accuracy level, so that
performance is purely reﬂected in response times. In particular,
we use the monetary incentive condition as reference and inter-
polate the data point of the symbolic group along its SATF to
the corresponding accuracy level of 94.3% (see the corresponding
ﬁlled small circle in Figure 1). As a result we obtain an accuracy-
referencedresponsetime (ARRT)of 440msforthesymbolicincen-
tive condition. That is,the 1.9% drop in accuracy translates into a
decrease of 23ms in response times. In order to compare perfor-
mancebetweenpayoffschemes,ARRTsintheDLPscheme(650ms
deadline, neutral ﬂankers; see left panel of Figure 1)a r ec o m -
putedforthesameaccuracylevel.Notably,choosingthedatapoint
closest to the overall mean of accuracies as reference permits the
interpolation (in contrast to extrapolation) of values in the other
conditions; that is,ARRTs are only estimated within the ranges of
their empirical SATFs. Thus, ARRTs provide a novel and largely
unbiased approach to estimate performance in speeded decisions
as they account for the correlation between response latencies and
errorrates(forsimilarapproachesseeKliegletal.,1995;Oberauer
and Kliegl,2001).
In Experiment 1, ARRTs on averaged data were computed
separately for ﬂanker types across payoff schemes and incentive
conditions (see Figure 1). For each deadline, response times were
linearly interpolated2 to the accuracy level of the empirical data
2ItseemsreasonabletocalculateARRTsonthebasisof non-linearratherthanlinear
data ﬁts. In particular, numerous studies describe SATFs as a negatively accelerated
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Table 1 | Mean response times and proportion of correct responses (accuracy).
Payoff–incentives 450ms deadline 525ms deadline 650ms deadline
RT Accuracy RT Accuracy RT Accuracy
DLP-monetary (Experiment 1)
Incongruent 384 (5.34) 0.825 (0.020) 419 (5.16) 0.904 (0.013) 459 (7 .15) 0.955 (0.007)
Neutral 375 (4.34) 0.874 (0.015) 405 (4.13) 0.935 (0.010) 443 (6.83) 0.972 (0.006)
DLP-symbolic (Experiment 1)
Incongruent 402 (7 .76) 0.825 (0.020) 433 (6.27) 0.883 (0.013) 463 (9.74) 0.934 (0.009)
Neutral 386 (7 .66) 0.871 (0.017) 417 (7 .01) 0.931 (0.009) 442 (10.59) 0.955 (0.005)
DLnP-monetary (Experiment 1)
Incongruent 425 (8.41) 0.834 (0.014) 462 (6.94) 0.897 (0.011) 518 (9.21) 0.916 (0.007)
Neutral 415 (7 .45) 0.882 (0.014) 446 (6.16) 0.928 (0.008) 498 (8.79) 0.943 (0.008)
DLnP-symbolic (Experiment 1)
Incongruent 419 (9.42) 0.842 (0.016) 445 (9.54) 0.900 (0.010) 482 (15.00) 0.913 (0.009)
Neutral 406 (8.55) 0.890 (0.011) 430 (10.04) 0.935 (0.009) 463 (13.56) 0.962 (0.005)
ErrP-monetary (Experiment 2)
Incongruent 415 (5.49) 0.825 (0.018) 454 (5.99) 0.886 (0.012) 500 (9.02) 0.909 (0.009)
Neutral 401 (4.63) 0.884 (0.012) 435 (5.45) 0.927 (0.009) 486 (9.09) 0.939 (0.008)
ErrP-symbolic (Experiment 2)
Incongruent 416 (6.31) 0.860 (0.013) 448 (7 .09) 0.910 (0.009) 482 (8.21) 0.940 (0.008)
Neutral 404 (5.31) 0.898 (0.012) 430 (6.34) 0.942 (0.006) 465 (8.40) 0.967 (0.005)
ErrDLnP-monetary (Experiment 3)
Incongruent 383 (4.92) 0.823 (0.023) 416 (5.36) 0.881 (0.017) 448 (8.96) 0.932 (0.011)
Neutral 374 (3.68) 0.866 (0.020) 403 (5.40) 0.932 (0.015) 431 (7 .90) 0.951 (0.011)
ErrDLnP-symbolic (Experiment 3)
Incongruent 406 (9.33) 0.820 (0.020) 438 (10.33) 0.855 (0.018) 469 (12.60) 0.914 (0.013)
Neutral 395 (7 .98) 0.861 (0.022) 422 (8.94) 0.908 (0.014) 454 (12.32) 0.938 (0.013)
Standard errors of means are given in parentheses.
point that was closest to the grand mean of accuracies (i.e., least
squarederror).Individualsubjectdatawerethencorrectedaccord-
ingly, such that the overall range of accuracies shrunk, but that
empirical and referenced data points were situated on the same
SATF. Individual ARRTs were submitted to four-way ANOVAs on
between-subjects factors payoff scheme (DLP, DLnP) and incen-
tives (monetary, symbolic), and within-subjects factors deadline
(long, medium, short), and ﬂanker type (neutral, incongruent).
Mean ARRTs together with corresponding accuracies are listed in
Table 2. Results of the ANOVAs on unreferenced response times
and accuracies are shown in “Experiment 1” in the Appendix.
Analyses were conducted in R, a language and environment for
statistical computing (R Development Core Team, 2011). Data
were visualized with the R-package ggplot2 (Wickham, 2009).
exponential function of the form
Accuracy (t) = v + (λ − v)

1 − e−β(t−δ)

, for t > δ, else 0,
where ν represents the parameter for chance performance, λ corresponds to the
asymptote, β determines the rate with which the asymptote is reached, and δ is
time (t) where accuracy leaves chance level. However, with only three empirical
data points (deadlines) per experimental condition, this model would be an over-
parameterizationof ourdata.Wethereforechoselinearinterpolationasthesimplest
approach without requiring additional assumptions.
RESULTS
A signiﬁcant main effect of payoff scheme in the four-way
ANOVA revealed faster ARRTs (p <0.001) for the DLP (i.e.,
20 point penalty for missed deadlines) than for the DLnP
scheme (i.e., no penalty for deadline misses). Further, an
interaction of payoff scheme×incentives (p =0.005) pointed
to faster ARRTs for monetary than for symbolic condition
under the DLP scheme; in contrast ARRTs under the DLnP
scheme were slower for monetary than for symbolic incen-
tives (see below). Since the four-way interaction of pay-
off scheme×incentives×deadline×ﬂanker type was signiﬁcant
(p <0.001), we scrutinized further effects in separate three-way
ANOVAs on the factors incentives×deadline×ﬂanker type for
each payoff scheme. Table 3 presents a full list of the four-way
ANOVA results.
DLP payoff scheme
Under the DLP scheme, ARRTs increased with deadline,
F(2,96)=41.28, p<0.001, and were faster for neutral than for
incongruent ﬂankers, F(1,48)=217.58, p<0.001. Critically, as
indicated in the above analysis, a main effect of incentives,
F(1,48)=4.67, p =0.036, revealed faster ARRTs for the mon-
etary than for the symbolic condition. Further, an interac-
tion of incentives×ﬂanker type, F(1,48)=12.85, p<0.001, indi-
cated a larger incentive effect for incongruent than for neutral
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FIGURE 1 | Speed–accuracy tradeoff functions for incentive conditions
(monetary, symbolic) and ﬂanker types (neutral, incongruent) under the
payoff schemes DLP [10, −10; −20] and DLnP [10, −10; 0] of Experiment
1. Open symbols in each function reﬂect empirical data points across three
deadline conditions (450, 525, 650ms). Small ﬁlled symbols show
corresponding accuracy-referenced response times (ARRTs).
Table 2 | Means of accuracy-referenced response times and corresponding accuracies for the payoff schemes DLP and DLnP (Experiment 1) as
well as DLP and ErrP (Experiment 2) across three deadlines (450, 525, 650ms).
DLP DLnP//ErrP Accuracy
Incentives/deadline 450 525 650 450 525 650 450 525 650
EXPERIMENT 1
Monetary
Incongruent 391 419 426 430 484 510 0.842 0.904 0.913
Neutral 382 402 413 420 446 498 0.890 0.928 0.943
Symbolic
Incongruent 411 445 450 419 457 482 0.842 0.904 0.913
Neutral 396 416 430 406 427 440 0.890 0.928 0.943
EXPERIMENT 2
Monetary
Incongruent 399 419 423 437 490 500 0.860 0.904 0.909
Neutral 386 402 408 412 435 486 0.898 0.927 0.939
Symbolic
Incongruent 420 445 448 416 444 448 0.860 0.904 0.909
Neutral 400 415 425 404 422 428 0.898 0.927 0.939
stimuli.Finally,therewasaninteractionof deadline×ﬂankertype,
F(2,96)=11.58, p<0.001.
Performance differences between incentive conditions were
also reﬂected in the total amount of points gained throughout
the experiment. Scores were signiﬁcantly higher in the monetary
(mean:1168;SD:67) compared to the symbolic condition (mean:
931; SE: 91), F(1,148)=4.44,p=0.037.
DLnP payoff scheme
Main effects of deadline, F(2,104)=119.36, p<0.001, and
ﬂanker type, F(1,52)=309.51, p<0.001, were signiﬁcant in the
DLnP scheme. Moreover, the inﬂuence of incentives was reli-
able, F(1,52)=4.21, p=0.045; however, different from the DLP
scheme, ARRTs were slower for monetary than for symbolic
incentives. The two-way interactions of deadline×incentives,
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Table 3 | Results of four-wayANOVAs on accuracy-referenced response times in Experiment 1 and 2.
Experiment 1: DLP–DLnP Experiment 2: DLP–ErrP
df F Pr(>F)d f F Pr(>F)
Payoff scheme 1 21.60 <0.001 1 19.79 <0.001
Incentives 1 0.33 0.567 1 1.45 0.231
Payoff×incentives 1 8.24 0.005 1 18.01 <0.001
Residuals 100 98
Deadline 2 153.09 <0.001 2 101.79 <0.001
Deadline×payoff 2 13.50 <0.001 2 10.11 <0.001
Deadline×incentives 2 3.12 0.046 2 6.85 0.001
Deadline×payoff×incentives 2 4.39 0.014 2 8.77 <0.001
Residuals 200 196
Flanker type 1 526.62 <0.001 1 626.96 <0.001
Flanker×payoff 1 13.51 <0.001 1 7 .62 0.007
Flanker×incentives 1 22.02 <0.001 1 1.41 0.238
Flanker×payoff×incentives 1 <0.01 0.966 1 39.11 <0.001
Residuals 100 98
Deadline×ﬂanker 2 48.97 <0.001 2 35.55 <0.001
Deadline×ﬂanker×payoff 2 6.67 0.001 2 11.28 <0.001
Deadline×ﬂanker×incentives 2 13.37 <0.001 2 11.28 <0.001
Deadline×ﬂanker×payoff×incentives 2 17 .04 <0.001 2 16.04 <0.001
Residuals 200 196
Between-subjects factors are payoff scheme (DLP , DLnP in Experiment 1; DLP , ErrP in Experiment 2) and incentives (monetary, symbolic).Within-subjects factors are
deadline (long, medium, short) and ﬂanker type (neutral, incongruent).
F(2,104)=6.86, p=0.002, ﬂanker type×incentives, F(1,52)=
9.89, p =0.002, and deadline×ﬂanker type, F(2,104)=40.75,
p<0.001, were further qualiﬁed by a reliable three-way inter-
action of deadline×ﬂanker type×incentives, F(1,104)=26.51,
p<0.001,indicatingthattheincentiveeffectincreasedwithdead-
line, and that this increase was stronger for neutral than for
incongruent stimuli at the longest deadline, whereas the pattern
was reversed for the shorter deadlines.
Analogously to ARRTs, the pattern of earned points was
reversed compared to the DLP scheme. Under DLnP, participants
yieldednumericallyhigherscoresinthesymbolic(mean:1299;SD:
42)thaninthemonetaryincentivegroup(mean:1204;SD:40);the
difference revealed a statistical trend, F(1,160)=2.70,p=0.102.
DISCUSSION
The results demonstrate that payoff schemes critically inﬂuence
incentive effects. Besides the ﬁnding that responses were gener-
ally faster with (DLP) than without (DLnP) penalties for deadline
misses, the two schemes resulted in opposite effects of monetary
incentives.
In the DLP scheme, ARRTs as well as the number of attained
pointsattestedbetterperformanceformonetarythanforsymbolic
incentives; this pattern replicated the previous ﬁnding of Hübner
and Schlösser (2010). Moreover, a stronger incentive effect for
incongruent than for neutral stimuli pointed to improved spatial
selectivityinthemonetarycondition.Thatis,thenegativeeffectof
incongruent ﬂankers was larger for symbolic incentives, suggest-
ing a broader attentional focus than in the monetary condition.
This result extends Hübner and Schlösser’s report of a similar
trend and indicates that monetary incentives can enhance atten-
tional spatial selection. Yet, Seifert et al. (2006) found a larger
ﬂanker effect in rewarded compared to non-incentivized trials.
As one possible reason, payoffs (monetary rewards, penalties, or
neutral) in that study varied between trials, whereas constant
incentives (monetary or symbolic) and payoff schemes in our
experiment facilitated optimal adjustment of selective attention.
Yet,thisaccountisspeculativesincethereareotherdifferencesthat
might have contributed to the diverse patterns.
In contrast to improved performance under the DLP scheme,
responses were slower for monetary than for symbolic incentives
in the DLnP scheme. Compatible with the prediction of payoff-
speciﬁc response strategies, it seems that participants receiving
monetary incentives tried to respond slower in order to increase
accuracy, i.e., to avoid costly errors (cf, Kahneman and Tver-
sky, 1979). Indeed an increasing incentive effect with deadline
pointed to some effort of adjusting response times to the max-
imal time limit, irrespective of the risk of missing the deadline.
Yet, while this strategy appears reasonable, its realization turned
out to be suboptimal because performance was in fact worse in
the monetary condition. That is, although responses were suc-
cessfully retarded,the additional processing time did not translate
intoanequivalentincreaseinaccuracy.Accordingly,SATFsreveala
right-shift of data points in the monetary relative to the symbolic
condition: Subjects receiving monetary incentives needed more
time to achieve the same accuracy level as the symbolic group
(see Figure 1). Likewise, the response strategy failed in terms of
proﬁt maximization since the monetary group earned (numeri-
cally) less points than the symbolic group. Obviously,participants
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ignored the fact that fast responses are generally advantageous as
long as accuracy is above 50%. Hence, it seems that the response
strategy was not solely determined by the aim of proﬁt maximiza-
tion but also by the tendency to avoid errors (Maddox and Bohil,
1998).
Although we only expected a reduced rather than a negative
incentive effect in the DLnP scheme, the outcome is compatible
with the assumption of suboptimal performance due to competi-
tion between accuracy and speed requirements. Higher penalties
for errors than for slow responses emphasize accuracy over speed,
while at the same time imposing deadlines induce time pressure.
Arguably,this dilemma is especially relevant in the monetary con-
dition, where the actual proﬁt depends on performance. Thus,
compared to the speed-prioritizing DLP scheme, the necessity of
balancing accuracy against speed increases task complexity and
complicates the identiﬁcation of an optimal response strategy.
This may create an imbalance of task requirements and available
solutions,asituationthatisknowntocounteractpositiveincentive
effects(Bonneretal.,2000).Similarly,highsubjectivepressureand
the involvement of cognitive strategies in the presence of incen-
tivesoftenresultinadropof performancebelowparticipants’skill
levels (Baumeister, 1984; Beilock, 2008; Chu et al., 2010; DeCaro
et al.,2011).
In summary, Experiment 1 suggests that penalties for errors
and slow responses play different roles for monetary incentive
effects. When missed deadlines are punished participants have a
strongmotivationtorespondfast,andtheydosowithoutsacriﬁc-
ingmuchaccuracy.Conversely,whentherearepenaltiesforerrors
butnotformisseddeadlinesparticipantssucceedinslowingdown
response speed, but they fail to improve performance.
Yet, besides deadline penalties, another and potentially con-
founding difference between the payoff schemes was a generally
lowerlevelof punishmentintheDLnPthanintheDLPcondition.
Participants in the DLP scheme faced the risk of losing 10 or 20
points for errors or deadline misses, respectively, while the maxi-
mum gain per trial was 10 points. In contrast, participants in the
DLnPschemecouldmaximallylose10pointspertrial.Hence,itis
unclear whether improved performance for monetary incentives
in the DLP condition resulted from the high penalty for deadline
misses, or from the overall ratio of loss and gain opportunities.
Experiment 2 examined this issue.
EXPERIMENT 2
In this experiment we tested potential inﬂuences of the propor-
tion of beneﬁts and losses. Like in Experiment 1,we used a payoff
scheme entailing a 10-point gain for correct responses faster than
the deadline. However, this time errors before the deadline were
punishedwithalossof 20points,whereasdeadlinemissesresulted
in a 10-point penalty. Thus, in this Error-Punished scheme (ErrP
or [10, −20; −10]), penalty was higher for errors than for missed
deadlines,while the overall ratio of gains to losses was the same as
in the DLP scheme of Experiment 1 [10,−10; −20].
We expected that the ErrP scheme yields a similarly positive
inﬂuence of monetary incentives as the DLP scheme, if incentive
effectsdependontheoverallgain-to-lossratio.Alternatively,if the
effect is particularly driven by an emphasis of speed due to high
penalties of slow responses, the ErrP scheme should not yield a
positive effect. Rather,the pattern of results may be similar to that
of the DLnP scheme in Experiment 1.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
A total of 52 participants recruited at the University of Konstanz
were randomly assigned to the monetary (N=26, 22.1years, 16
female) and the symbolic incentive group (N=26, 24.5years, 17
female; see text footnote 1).
Stimuli, procedure, and analyses
Stimuli,task,andprocedurewerethesameasinExperiment1,but
a different payoff scheme was used in Experiment 2: Participants
received 10 points for correct responses that were faster than the
deadline. Erroneous responses faster than the deadline resulted in
a 20 point loss and deadline misses entailed a penalty of 10 points
in the Error-Punished scheme (ErrP or [10, −20; −10]).
Response times shorter than 100ms and longer than 2500ms
were excluded. Mean response latencies (deadline misses and
errors not excluded) and accuracies (proportion of correct
answers) are shown in Table 1. Figure 2 illustrates SATFs of the
ErrP scheme together with the DLP and the DLnP schemes of
Experiment 1 and the data of Experiment 3 (ErrDLnP scheme).
For analyses,ARRTs were jointly computed for the ErrP payoff
scheme of Experiment 2 and the DLP scheme of Experiment 1
(see Materials and Methods of Experiment 1 and Table 2). ARRTs
were ﬁrst compared in a four-way ANOVA on between-subjects
factors payoff scheme (DLP, ErrP) and incentives (monetary, sym-
bolic),andwithin-subjectsfactorsdeadline (long,medium,short),
and ﬂanker type (neutral, incongruent). Data of the ErrP scheme
were then scrutinized in a three-wayANOVA. Results of ANOVAs
on unreferenced response times and accuracies are depicted in
“Experiment 2”in the Appendix.
RESULTS
A signiﬁcant main effect of payoff scheme in the four-
way ANOVA revealed faster ARRTs for the DLP than for
the ErrP scheme (p<0.001). In addition, an interaction of
payoff scheme×incentives (p<0.001) yielded slower ARRTs
for the monetary than for the symbolic condition in the
ErrP scheme (see below), while the opposite held for the
DLP scheme (cf, Experiment 1). The effects of the four-
way ANOVA were qualiﬁed by a four-way interaction of pay-
off scheme×incentives×deadline×ﬂanker type (p<0.001; see
Table 3 for a full list of results).
ErrP payoff scheme
Like in Experiment 1, the ErrP scheme revealed increasing
ARRTs with deadline, F(2,100)=99.58,p<0.001,as well as faster
ARRTsforneutralthanforincongruentﬂankers,F(1,50)=350.02,
p<0.001. A main effect of incentives, F(1,50)=14.44, p<0.001
conﬁrmed slower ARRTs for the monetary than for the
symbolic condition. Further, the effect increased with dead-
line, as indicated by the incentive×deadline interaction,
F(2,100)=17.53,p<0.001.An interaction of incentives×ﬂanker
type, F(1,50)=24.36, p<0.001, together with an interaction of
deadline×ﬂanker type, F(2,100)=35.81, p<0.001 was quali-
ﬁedbythethree-wayinteractionof incentives×deadline×ﬂanker
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FIGURE 2 | Speed–accuracy tradeoff functions for monetary and
symbolic incentives in the payoff schemes DLP [10, −10; −20] and DLnP
[10, −10; 0] of Experiment 1, in the ErrP scheme [10, −20; −10] of
Experiment 2, as well as in the ErrDLnP scheme [10, 0; 0] of Experiment
3. Data points in each function reﬂect three deadline conditions (450, 525,
650ms).
type, F(2,100)=22.61, p<0.001, indicating that the incentive
effect was substantially smaller for neutral than for incongruent
stimuli at the two fastest deadlines, whereas it was of similar size
at the longest deadline.
Concerning performance-dependent points, absolute scores
were signiﬁcantly higher in the symbolic (mean: 974; SD: 68)
than in the monetary group (mean:756;SD:67),F(1,154)=5.22,
p=0.024. This pattern is similar to the DLnP data and opposite
to the DLP scheme of Experiment 1.
DISCUSSION
Experiment 2 tested whether positive effects of monetary incen-
tives depend on the overall ratio of beneﬁts to losses in payoff
schemes. The results do not support this hypothesis, but con-
ﬁrmed the conclusions derived from the ﬁndings in Experiment
1. Under the ErrP scheme, where penalty was smaller for dead-
line misses than for errors,responses were slower than in the DLP
payoff scheme. Moreover, slower ARRTs and a smaller amount of
earned points in the ErrP scheme indicated worse performance
for the monetary than for the symbolic condition, an effect that
increased with deadline in ARRTs. Thus, the data suggest that the
ratio of gains to losses in a payoff scheme plays a subordinate role
for positive incentive effects.
Instead, the results line up with the data of the DLnP scheme
in Experiment 1 that also yielded suboptimal performance for
monetary incentives, and they are in stark contrast to the positive
effects in the DLP scheme (see Figure 2). Apparently, response
strategies are substantially modulated by the relative height of
penalties for errors and deadline misses,a ﬁnding that is compati-
ble with the notion that impending losses have a major impact on
behavior (Kahneman and Tversky,1979). However,in the present
experiments performance was improved only when high penal-
ties for deadline misses encouraged speeded responses. This result
indicates that loss aversion does not generally produce a positive
relation between monetary incentives and performance and raises
the question whether explicit penalties are necessary for positive
incentive effects. It seems that a general emphasis of speed over
accuracyissufﬁcientinthisrespect.InExperiment3weaddressed
this issue.
EXPERIMENT 3
Data of Experiments 1 and 2 suggested that compulsion of speed
ratherthanofaccuracyimprovesperformanceinprospectofmon-
etary incentives. We established this ﬁnding using payoff schemes
in which deadline misses received higher (DLP) or lower pun-
ishment than errors (DLnP, ErrP), and entailed either explicit
penalties(DLP,ErrP)orjusttheabsenceofrewards(DLnP).These
schemes leave open,though,whether penalties are in fact impera-
tive for positive incentive effects.Alternatively,similar results may
beobtainedwhenneithererrorsnordeadlinemissesarepunished,
and therefore have the same ﬁnancial consequences3.
Given our previous considerations, the latter option appears
indeed possible because – similar to the DLP scheme – payoff
3We thank the reviewer who pointed this out for suggesting Experiment 3.
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involving rewards for fast correct responses but no penalties or
rewards for errors and deadline misses should emphasize speed
over accuracy. The reason is that such a scheme comes with a 0%
chance to gain proﬁt for any response missing the deadline, irre-
spective of correctness. In contrast, odds for responses meeting
time demands amount to at least 50%,i.e.,when subjects are sim-
ply guessing. Thus, a strategy of speeding up responses to avoid
deadline misses is generally more proﬁtable than attempting to
maximizeaccuracybyacceptingslowresponses.SimilartotheDLP
scheme in Experiment 1, zero-penalties for errors and deadlines
thereforeprioritizespeedandpotentiallyengagepositiveincentive
effects.
We tested this possibility in Experiment 3 with an Error-
and-Deadline-not-Punished (ErrDLnP or [10, 0; 0]) scheme that
involved 10-point beneﬁts for fast and correct responses, but nei-
ther gains nor losses for errors or deadline misses. We expected
that monetary incentives improve performance if positive effects
depend on an emphasis of speed over accuracy. In contrast, if
incentiveeffectsdependonexplicitpunishmentof slowresponses,
monetary, and symbolic conditions may reveal similar results.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
A total of 36 participants from the University of Konstanz were
randomly assigned to the monetary (N=18, 23.8years, 8 female)
and the symbolic incentive group (N=18, 24.3years, 14 female;
see text footnote 1).
Stimuli, procedure, and analyses
Stimuli, task, and procedure were adopted from the previous
experiments, except for the payoff scheme. In the Error-and-
Deadline-not-Punished scheme of Experiment 3 (ErrDLnP or [10,
0; 0]),participants received 10 points for correct responses before
the deadline, whereas errors and deadline misses entailed neither
gains nor losses.
As before, response times shorter than 100ms and longer than
2500mswerediscarded.Meanresponselatencies(deadlinemisses
and errors not excluded) and accuracies (proportion of correct
answers) are shown in Table 1. Figure 2 illustrates SATFs of the
ErrDLnP scheme together with data from Experiments 1 and 2.
ARRTs for incentive conditions in the ErrDLnP scheme were
calculated separately for neutral and incongruent stimuli (see
Materials and Methods of Experiment 1 and Table 4) and were
submitted to a three-way ANOVA with the between-subjects fac-
tor incentives (monetary, symbolic) and within-subjects factors
deadline (long, medium, short), and ﬂanker type (neutral, incon-
gruent). Results of ANOVAs on unreferenced response times and
accuracies are listed in“Experiment 3”in the Appendix.
RESULTS
In the ErrDLnP scheme, ARRTs increased with deadline,
F(2,68)=76.14, p<0.001, and were longer for incongruent than
for neutral ﬂankers, F(1,34)=109.65, p<0.001. Importantly, a
reliableincentive effect,F(1,34)=8.58,p=0.006,revealedshorter
ARRTs for the monetary than for the symbolic group, a pat-
tern that corresponds to the DLP scheme of Experiment 1. Fur-
ther, the interaction of deadline×ﬂanker type, F(2,68)=6.17,
Table 4 | Means of accuracy-referenced response times and
corresponding accuracies for the payoff scheme ErrDLnP (Experiment
3) across three deadlines (450, 525, 650ms).
Incentives/deadline ARRT Accuracy
450 525 650 450 525 650
EXPERIMENT 3
Monetary
Incongruent 383 401 437 0.823 0.855 0.914
Neutral 374 393 411 0.866 0.908 0.938
Symbolic
Incongruent 409 438 469 0.823 0.855 0.914
Neutral 397 422 454 0.866 0.908 0.938
p=0.003, was qualiﬁed by a three-way interaction of incen-
tives×deadline×ﬂankertype,indicatingasmallerincentiveeffect
for neutral than for incongruent stimuli at short deadlines,
whereas the reverse pattern held for the longest deadline (cf,
Table 4).
Similar to the pattern of performance-contingent scores in the
DLP scheme (Experiment 1), subjects earned more points in the
monetary(mean:1592;SD:35)thaninthesymbolicgroup(mean:
1479; SD: 43), F(1,106)=4.23,p=0.042.
DISCUSSION
Experiment 3 attested improved performance for monetary over
symbolic incentives when neither errors nor deadline misses were
punished. This pattern is in accordance with results from the
DLP scheme of Experiment 1, that involved higher penalties for
slowthanforerroneousresponses(seealsoHübnerandSchlösser,
2010).Infact,SATFsinthemonetaryconditionrevealedaconsid-
erable similarity between ErrDLnP and DLP data (Figure 2,l e f t
panel); accordingly, ARRT differences between the two schemes
were far from being signiﬁcant (F<1). Concerning the symbolic
condition,therewasasmallandnotreliabletrend[F(1,41)=2.30,
p =0.13] toward slower responses for the ErrDLnP scheme.
Importantly,theanalogouseffectsintheErrDLnPandtheDLP
scheme are compatible with the notion of improved performance
inprospectofmonetaryincentives,whenpayoffschemesprioritize
responsespeedratherthanaccuracy.Moreover,thedatashowthat
explicit penalties are not imperative for positive incentive effects,
butthatequalpayoffsforerrorsanddeadlinemissesevokeasimilar
pattern.Thusmonetaryincentivesappeartoenhanceperformance
when penalties for errors do not exceed those of deadline misses.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present study examined the role of payoff schemes for the
relationbetweenmonetaryincentivesandperformanceinspeeded
perceptualdecisionmaking.Theissueisof greatinterestbecause–
against common belief – positive inﬂuences of monetary incen-
tives are not warranted. Rather, many studies report no or even
negative effects (Jenkins et al., 1998; Camerer and Hogarth, 1999;
Bonneretal.,2000;BonnerandSprinkle,2002).Thissuggeststhat
theimpactof incentivesdependsonspeciﬁcconditionsandmedi-
ating factors, such as payoff schemes. The exact nature of these
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relations, however, is not well established. For instance, while a
payoff scheme with high penalties for missed deadlines yielded
improvedperformanceformonetarycomparedtosymbolicincen-
tivesinapreviousﬂankertask(HübnerandSchlösser,2010)itwas
unclear whether monetary incentives are generally advantageous
for this task,or whether the positive effect depends on the speciﬁc
payoff scheme. Here, we addressed this question by manipulating
the magnitude of penalties for slow responses and errors.
Experiment 1 compared incentive effects under conditions of
relatively high (DLP) versus no (DLnP) penalties for deadline
misses.While improved performance for the monetary compared
to the symbolic condition in the DLP scheme replicated the previ-
ous ﬁnding (Hübner and Schlösser, 2010), the effect was reversed
for the DLnP scheme: Monetary incentives led to a reduced per-
formance. The latter result was conﬁrmed in Experiment 2 (ErrP
scheme),where slow responses entailed penalties,but where pun-
ishment for errors was higher, so that the overall ratio of gains to
losses was identical to the DLP scheme. Thus, while the adjust-
ment of response strategies in these payoff schemes point to
marked behavioral variation in order to avoid punishment (e.g.,
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), the data demonstrate that a pos-
itive relation between monetary incentives and performance can
only be obtained when there is a relatively high penalty for slow
responses.Yet,the results of Experiment 3 show that explicit pun-
ishment is not necessary. A similar positive effect of monetary
incentives on performance was found when neither errors nor
deadlinemissesentailedpenalties(ErrDLnPscheme).Itwassufﬁ-
cient to apply a payoff scheme that induced priority of speed over
accuracy.
Presumably, an emphasis of speed encouraged participants
to meet time demands by accepting reduced accuracy of rapid
responses. That is, high penalties for slow responses in the DLP
scheme rendered fast reactions more proﬁtable than deadline
misses. Likewise, the ErrDLnP scheme implied a 0% chance of
proﬁt when deadlines were missed, but at least a 50% chance (in
caseofguessing)forfasterresponses.Apparently,participantswere
abletotranslatetheseoddsintoappropriatestrategies:Withmon-
etary incentives, they speeded up their responses while sacriﬁcing
relativelylittleaccuracy.Aplausibleaccountforthispositiveeffect
is that performance-contingent payment motivated the engage-
ment of additional resources, such as an increase of attentional
effort (Sarter et al., 2006). As suggested by Hübner and Schlösser
(2010), this extra effort may then have caused a general improve-
ment of sensory encoding quality. Yet, the smaller ﬂanker effect
under the DLP scheme also points to a speciﬁc enhancement of
selective spatial attention in the monetary compared to the sym-
bolic condition. This ﬁnding augments the previous report of
a trend in this direction for short deadlines only (Hübner and
Schlösser, 2010), whereas the incentive effect in the DLP scheme
wasrelativelyconstantacrossdeadlines(seeFigure1).Overall,the
data provide strong evidence that monetary incentives enhanced
theefﬁciencyof stimulusprocessingwhenpayoff schemesstressed
the relevance of speed.
In contrast to the DLP and the ErrDLnP schemes, higher
penalties for errors than for deadline misses (i.e., DLnP and
ErrP schemes) emphasized accuracy rather than speed. That is,
the avoidance of errors received priority in order to maximize
proﬁt. At the same time, however, deadline-induced time pres-
sure resulted in a competition between responding quickly and
responding correctly; hence, the choice of an optimal response
strategymayhavebeenmoredifﬁcult.Especiallywiththeprospect
ofmonetaryincentives,suchanincreaseoftaskdemandsenhances
subjective pressure and presumably the involvement of various
cognitivestrategies,asituationthathasbeenshowntoimpairper-
formance (e.g., Camerer and Hogarth, 1999; Beilock, 2008). Our
observation of negative incentive effects for payoff schemes with
highlypunishederrorsiscompatiblewiththisinterpretation.Pre-
sumably, participants in the monetary group reduced response
speed in order to avoid loss, but failed to improve performance.
As one of the reviewers pointed out, it is also possible that
under the DLnP and ErrP schemes participants falsely assumed
that they were expected to take longer to get it right and even
more so when there were monetary incentives.Although we think
that this is unlikely, we cannot deﬁnitively exclude it. Objectively,
at least, there was no such requirement. Rather, it was expected
thatparticipantsmaximizetheirproﬁt,especiallyundermonetary
incentives.Todoso,theycouldhaveperformedinthesamewayas
the participants under the DLP scheme. But this is not what they
did. Instead, they merely reduced their speed without using the
extra time to increase accuracy, which is suboptimal in terms of
earned points and money. In particular under the DLnP scheme
the equal payoff for correct and erroneous responses rendered
reactions before the deadline generally favorable as long as accu-
racy stays above 50%. However, participants chose the opposite
strategy. They reduced response speed even though they missed
the opportunity to gain points.
Together, our results suggest that payoff schemes critically
mediate the relation between monetary incentives and perfor-
mance. This interaction is also evident in Figure 2 that illustrates
data of the four schemes separately for symbolic and mone-
tary conditions. Concerning the symbolic group (Figure 2, right
panel) it seems that payoff schemes had only moderate effects.
While responses in the ErrDLnP scheme tend to be somewhat
slower, almost all data points from the other schemes appear to
originate from a common SATF. This indicates that participants
largely adapted to individual conditions by simply adjusting their
responsecriteria(e.g.,RatcliffandRouder,1998;McElreeandCar-
rasco,1999;UsherandMcClelland,2001;Ratcliff andSmith,2004;
Miller et al., 2008; Hübner et al., 2010). In contrast, the data for
monetary incentives clearly show that the DLP and the ErrDLnP
schemes stick out (Figure 2, left panel). Compared to the other
twopayoff schemes,thesubstantialincreaseof performancesigni-
ﬁesthemobilizationof additionaleffortwhenfastresponsesentail
higher beneﬁts.
The consideration of our data from different perspectives con-
sistently indicates that enhanced performance under monetary
incentives is conﬁned to payoff schemes emphasizing response
speed over accuracy, at least in speeded perceptual decision tasks.
In other words, successful strategies to optimize proﬁt are more
easily exerted in settings that require control of speed rather than
of accuracy. This notion appears to be compatible with the pro-
posal of two systems that are involved in decision making: A fast
pathway that makes rapid binary choices and a slow but more
accurate cognitive system (Trimmer et al., 2008). Accordingly, an
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emphasis of speed would lead to an increased weight of the fast
systemwhereasafocusonaccuracyrequiresstrongerinvolvement
of slow cognitive processes (see also Hübner et al.,2010).Yet,fur-
ther studies are needed to test the validity of this interpretation;at
the moment this account remains speculative.
In conclusion, the present study ﬁts into existing literature
indicating that a multitude of factors mediates the inﬂuence of
monetary incentives. The data demonstrate that payoff schemes,
and in particular penalties for errors versus slow responses, can
trigger qualitatively different behavior. Speciﬁcally, our ﬁndings
suggest that payoff schemes support positive monetary effects
when penalties for errors do not exceed those for slow responses.
The present study may therefore contribute to the clariﬁcation of
the yet mixed picture of incentive effects on performance.
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APPENDIX
EXPERIMENT 1
Results of four-way ANOVAs on unreferenced response times
andaccuracieswithbetween-subjectsfactorspayoff scheme(DLP,
DLnP) and incentives (monetary, symbolic), and within-subjects
factors deadline (long,medium,short),and ﬂanker type (neutral,
incongruent).
df Response time Accuracy
F Pr(>F) F Pr(>F)
Payoff scheme 1 16.96 <0.001 0.04 0.840
Incentives 1 0.51 0.476 0.04 0.849
Payoff×incentives 1 3.71 0.057 0.93 0.337
Residuals 100
Deadline 2 295.90 <0.001 165.07 <0.001
Deadline×payoff 2 2.55 0.081 6.15 0.003
Deadline×incentives 2 7 .65 <0.001 0.38 0.681
Deadline×payoff×
incentives
2 0.85 0.430 0.39 0.675
Residuals 200
Flanker type 1 298.81 <0.001 146.36 <0.001
Flanker×payoff 1 0.04 0.837 0.44 0.510
Flanker×incentives 1 1.62 0.206 1.34 0.250
Flanker×payoff×
incentives
1 0.53 0.468 0.02 0.882
Residuals 100
Deadline×Flanker 2 7 .63 <0.001 5.57 0.004
Deadline×Flanker×
payoff
2 0.28 0.758 2.72 0.069
Deadline×Flanker×
incentives
2 0.73 0.485 1.02 0.363
Deadline×Flanker×
payoff×incentives
2 0.13 0.877 0.93 0.397
Residuals 200
EXPERIMENT 2
Results of four-way ANOVAs on unreferenced response times
andaccuracieswithbetween-subjectsfactorspayoff scheme(DLP,
ErrP) and incentives (monetary, symbolic), and within-subjects
factors deadline (long,medium,short),and ﬂanker type (neutral,
incongruent).
df Response time Accuracy
F Pr(>F) F Pr(>F)
Payoff scheme 1 17 .68 <0.001 0.04 0.836
Incentives 1 0.01 0.940 0.57 0.454
Payoff×incentives 1 2.29 0.133 3.57 0.061
Residuals 98
Deadline 2 345.66 <0.001 180.22 <0.001
Deadline×payoff 2 2.10 0.125 6.21 0.002
Deadline×incentives 2 6.13 0.003 0.36 0.696
Deadline×payoff×
incentives
2 0.30 0.743 0.78 0.461
Residuals 196
Flanker type 1 336.67 <0.001 142.81 <0.001
Flanker×payoff 1 0.14 0.709 0.15 0.699
Flanker×incentives 1 0.57 0.451 0.17 0.685
Flanker×payoff×
incentives
1 1.84 0.179 1.95 0.166
Residuals 98
Deadline×ﬂanker 2 2.82 0.062 8.61 <0.001
Deadline×ﬂanker×
payoff
2 0.87 0.421 0.49 0.613
Deadline×ﬂanker×
incentives
2 0.24 0.785 1.02 0.362
Deadline×ﬂanker×
payoff×incentives
2 0.31 0.733 0.35 0.702
Residuals 196
EXPERIMENT 3
Resultsofthree-wayANOVAsonunreferencedresponsetimesand
accuracies with the between-subjects factor incentives (monetary,
symbolic), and within-subjects factors deadline (long, medium,
short), and ﬂanker type (neutral, incongruent).
df Response time Accuracy
F Pr(>F) F Pr(>F)
Incentives 1 3.93 0.056 0.51 0.482
Residuals 34
Deadline 2 103.34 <0.001 94.60 <0.001
Deadline×
incentives
2 0.03 0.968 1.24 0.297
Residuals 68
Flanker type 1 102.17 <0.001 42.12 <0.001
Flanker×
incentives
1 0.03 0.854 0.02 0.893
Residuals 34
Deadline×ﬂanker 2 2.07 0.134 4.34 0.017
Deadline×ﬂanker
×incentives
2 0.43 0.650 0.04 0.963
Residuals 68
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